Consider the following collective choice problem: a society of budget-constrained agents faces multiple alternatives and wants to reach an e¢ cient decision (i.e. to Nash implement the utilitarian maximum). In this paper, we propose a budget-balanced vote-buying mechanism for this setting: for each alternative, every voter can cast any number of votes, x, in support or against it, by transferring an amount x 2 to the rest of the voters; and the outcome is determined by the net vote totals. We prove that as the society grows large, in every equilibrium of the mechanism, each agent's transfer converges to zero, and the probability that the mechanism chooses the socially e¢ cient outcome converges to one.
Consider a collective choice problem with many strategic agents and multiple alternatives. Assume the group facing this collective choice wishes to choose the alternative that maximizes the sum of utilities (the utilitarian optimum), and wants to make this choice through a procedure that is easy to execute. By "easy to execute"we mean a procedure that does not require a budget sacri…ce to run (budget-balance), and that makes it possible for agents with time or budget constraints to participate, by not requiring agents to report complex messages and by minimizing monetary transfers across agents.
Even under a restriction of the preference domain to quasilinear pro…les (preferences that are separable over the alternative and wealth, and risk neutral on wealth), any group facing a collective-choice with multiple alternatives encounters a di¢ cult challenge: in order for the choice to always be the utilitarian optimum for any equilibrium for any publicly revealed realization of preferences, the decision-making mechanism must Nash implement the utilitarian choice rule. Unfortunately, mechanisms known to Nash implement the utilitarian rule (e.g. Maskin 1999 ), use very complex message spaces, and are thus hard to use in any environment of applied interest.
The VCG mechanisms of Vickrey (1961) , Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) require only simpler messages, of dimension equal to the number of alternatives, and they feature one equilibrium that chooses the optimal alternative. However, these mechanisms are not budgetbalanced, they require large transfers, and they also feature equilibria that do not choose the optimal alternative. We can overcome the …rst problem by running a VCG mechanism with n 1 agents, and letting the n th agent be the residual claimant of all transfers; the resulting mechanism is budget balanced and features an equilibrium that is asymptotically optimal, in the sense that the probability that it chooses optimally converges to one in the size of the group (Jackson 2000) . But this approximate-VCG mechanism also features asymptotically ine¢ cient equilibria, and it still requires large transfers, so it cannot run if agents with intense preferences about the alternatives have tight individual budget constraints. 1 We propose a mechanism that satis…es almost all the desiderata laid out in the …rst paragraph: the mechanism is asymptotically optimal for every equilibrium, so it asymptotically Nash implements the utilitarian choice rule; is budget balanced; uses a message space of dimensionality as small as that of the VCG mechanism (as many dimensions as the number of alternatives); and it requires only vanishing transfers as the group becomes arbitrarily large. In short, the mechanism is easy to run, and it converges toward utilitarian optimality for large groups of (potentially) budget-constrained agents. 2 The mechanism we propose is a vote-buying mechanism with quadratic costs, in which agents can express any intensity of support or opposition to each alternative, at a cost that is the square of the intensity expressed. The total costs for an individual is aggregated across all alternatives, and this total cost is redistributed in the form of a transfer to all other agents. The choice is based on the net support for each alternative, so that the probability that an alternative is chosen increases in its net support.
This mechanism generalizes the "quadratic voting"mechanism for binary choices Weyl 2016, 2018) to an environment with multiple alternatives. 3 Under the restrictive but standard assumptions that agents' preferences over the choice of alternative and over wealth are separable, and that agents are risk neutral, we show that the mechanism is asymptotically e¢ cient: the mechanism chooses the alternative that maximizes social welfare with a probability that converges to one as the size of the group diverges to in…nity. In fact, the mechanism completely orders alternatives by their utilitarian order: the utilitarian optimum earns most net support, the socially second-best alternative obtains the second highest net support, etc. We also …nd that individual equilibrium costs and transfers converge to zero, so that any non-zero individual budget constraint becomes non-binding.
Some alternative mechanisms, such as voting procedures that choose the alternative that gets most votes are easy to use and -under some conditions-are optimal for binary choices (Börgers 2004 ; Krishna and Morgan 2015), but they do not work well for choice among multiple alternatives: they have multiple equilibria, many of them ine¢ cient. In some environments, voters may behave truthfully because devising manipulations is computationally infeasible (Conitzer et al. 2007; Faliszewski and Procaccia 2010; Brandt et al. 2016; Meir 2018) , and best-response dynamics can lead to outcomes that are nearly optimal according to some some scoring rules (Branzei et al. 2013 ). However, these outcomes obtained by truthful strategy pro…les, or by learning through best response dynamics, can also fail to attain utilitarian e¢ ciency. In contrast, under our mechanism, society asymptotically attains e¢ ciency in all equilibria.
Given that our mechanism's e¢ ciency result hinges on the agents being risk neutral, we refrain from proposing that democracies use it as the main means to aggregate (risk-averse) citizen's preferences over ideological choices. 4 Rather, a more suitable application is collective choice by agents who maximize expected pro…ts, such as any pro…t-maximizing …rms. Applications of particular interest include governance in cryptocurrencies, and collective choice in chambers of commerce or businesses'associations.
Model
Alternatives, agents and values. Let X f1; 2; :::; mg be a …nite set of alternatives, m 2 N; m 3. 5 Let N be a society with a countably in…nite number of agents.
For each agent i 2 N and each k 2 X; let u i k 2 [0; 1] denote the value that agent i assigns to alternative k (throughout the document, superscripts refer to agents, and subscripts to alternatives). This value can be understood as a quantity of real wealth that the agent would be willing to trade to obtain alternative k, instead of an outside worst alternative with value normalized to zero. Let u The game with n agents. For any …nite size n 2 Nnf1g; we consider the choice problem of 4 A possible alternative for these applications is storable votes (Casella 2005) , or a combination of storable votes and quadratic voting, such that voters are endowed with a stock of rights they can store and they can convert these rights into votes at a quadratic cost on any given decision. 5 Results apply as well for m = 2 as a special case.
choosing an alternative in X faced by the …nite subset f1; 2; :::; ng 2 N of the society, given the matrix of values v n :
Assumption 1 For each n 2 N; matrix v n is common knowledge among the subset of agents f1; 2; :::; ng:
Given the realization of the matrix of values v; and for each n 2 Nnf1g, society N (n) solves its collective choice problem by means of a quadratic vote-buying mechanism. A quadratic vote-buying mechanism for a binary choice problem (Lalley and Weyl 2018) , is such that each participant can cast any real-valued quantity of votes, and the alternative that the proposal passes is increasing in the net total quantity of votes. The mechanism charges each agent a monetary payment equal to the square of the votes cast by the agent, and redistributes the proceeds to all other agents, so that the mechanism is budget balanced.
We generalize this mechanism to multiple alternatives: each agent chooses how many votes to cast for or against each alternative, resulting in a net total for each alternative. The chosen alternative is a probabilistic function of net vote totals. For each alternative, each agent is charged the square of her votes for this alternative, so that an agent's total charge is the sum of these squares. Proceeds are redistributed to all other agents, to make the mechanism budget-balanced.
Note the mechanism's minimal requirements of information: in order to run, all that the mechanism (or the institution in charge of running it) needs is the means to verify whether any agent trying to submit an action is a member of the society. The mechanism does not need to know the number n of agents in the society, nor the distribution F from which values are drawn, not even the domain of this distribution.
Let (v n ) denote the game induced by this quadratic voting mechanism, for a given realization of the matrix of values v; and for a given n 2 Nnf1g:
The set of players in game (v n ) is the set of agents f1; 2; :::; ng: 6 A pure strategy for agent i in game (v n ) is just a choice of an action, so the set of pure strategies for each agent is S = [ 1; 1] m ; and the set of strategy pro…les is
Each component of the vector a i (v n ) can be interpreted as a quantity of votes cast for or 6 We can allow for unbounded action spaces, but we do not need them for our results.
against each alternative, or it can more accurately be interpreted as an expression of intensity of support or opposition to each alternative. Let
denote the matrix of actions taken by all agents in game (v n ); and let a i (v n ) be the matrix without row i: For each alternative k 2 X; de…ne
Given a(v n ); the quadratic voting mechanism chooses alternative k with probability
The substantively relevant property of this outcome function is that holding constant the net vote totals for other alternatives, the probability that alternative k is chosen is strictly increasing in the net vote total for k: 
:
These costs are interpreted as a monetary contribution to the mechanism, associated to any given action. The mechanism then redistributes all these contributions equally among all other agents, so as to be budget-balanced.
The utility for player i as a function of a(v n ) is
7 Our results hold if we assume instead that, for some 2
, in which case, as becomes large, the outcome function approximates a step function that selects the alternative with most net votes. For the sake of a more parsimonious exposition, we choose = 1:
n m ! R n be the function that maps an action (or strategy) pro…le into a utility pro…le, de…ned by
Then (v n ) (f1; 2; :::g; S n ; U v;n ) is the complete information, normal form game played by the subset of agents f1; 2; :::; ng given the realization of the matrix of values v:
A large number of agents. Given the realization of the matrix of values
denote the sequence of games, one for each size n 2 N. Note that each agent i 2 N plays in in…nitely many separate games: i is a player in each game in the subsequence f (v n )g 1 n=i : Each game is played separately, and while for each player i; the vector of values u i is constant across all games (it is the i th row of matrix v), player i can play a di¤erent action in each game (a i (v n ) conditions on v n ; which varies across games).
We consider a sequence of pure Nash equilibria that corresponds to this sequence of games. We identify the asymptotic welfare properties of these equilibria as the number of agents participating in the collective decision becomes su¢ ciently large.
Asymptotic optimality of quadratic voting
We …rst prove a preliminary result: that if the cost parameter c is su¢ ciently large, for each realization of the value matrix v; and for each n 2 Nnf1g; a pure Nash equilibrium of game (v n ) exists. 8 The intuition to establish this existence result is as follows. Fix v 2 [0; 1] N m and n 2
Nnf1g: The number of players in game (v n ) is …nite: speci…cally, it is n. Their action set is bounded. Their utilities, given by Expression (2), are continuous in actions, and bounded as well. We establish that the utility function (2) is concave in a i (v n ); which then implies existence of an equilibrium. All proofs are in the Appendix. Having established that if c > c; then a pure Nash equilibrium exists in the game with a …nite subset of the society, for any size of this …nite subset, and for any realization of values, we next derive asymptotic welfare properties of all such equilibria, if the subset of participating agents is su¢ ciently large.
We consider a sequence of games with increasing number of players, and all sequences of equilibria for these games. We obtain results for all equilibria su¢ ciently far along the sequence. For each n 2 N; and for each alternative k 2 X; let u k (v n ) denote the value that agents 1 through n assign on average to alternative k; so
By the (strong) law of large numbers, this observed average value u k (v n ) converges almost surely to the expected value u k :
The probability is with respect to the realization of the matrix of values v: In particular,
; the probability that there existsn 2 N such that
for any n >n and for each alternative k is one.
Hereafter, we consider realizations of v such that v 2 V:
For any v 2 V; we consider the sequence of games
n m denote a sequence of Nash equilibria corresponding to the sequence of games
Then, for each n 2 Nnf1g; and for each i 2 N (n);
In the Appendix, we prove several intermediate results en route to our main proposition.
Namely, for any v 2 V , for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
if the size n of the subset of participating agents f1; :::; ng is su¢ ciently large:
i) one alternative wins with probability arbitrarily close to one (Lemma 3 and Corollary 2). We call this alternative the "likely winner"and we denote it w(a (v));
ii) alternatives that are better than the likely winner receive strictly positive net aggregate actions, and alternatives that are worse than the likely winner receive strictly negative net aggregate actions (Lemma 4);
iii) if the likely winner is not the best alternative, then the net aggregate actions for the likely winner diverge toward in…nity (Lemma 5), and at the same time, the net aggregate actions for some other alternative worse than the likely winner decrease unboundedly toward minus in…nity, so the likely winner cannot be the worst alternative (Lemma 6 and Corollary 3); iv) and in fact, the net aggregate actions for all other alternatives worse than the likely winner decrease unboundedly toward minus in…nity (Lemma 7 and Corollary 4).
We seek to prove that the probability that the chosen alternative is the one that maximizes social welfare converges to one in the number of agents who participate in the quadratic voting mechanism. To formally state this result, we require additional de…nitions. Given an equilibrium a (v n ) 2 [ 1; 1] n m for each game (v n ) for each n 2 Nnf1g; and given the corresponding sequence of equilibria fa (v n )g
be the collection of equilibria, unconditional on v; so a speci…es an equilibrium to be played for any possible realization of the matrix of values v and any value of the size n: Let A denote the family of all such collections of equilibria.
For any n 2 Nnf1g and any v n 2 [0; 1] n m ; let b(v n ) X denote the set of best alterna-tives, de…ned by
These are the alternatives that maximize aggregate values. Given any collection of unconditional equilibria a 2 A ; for each game (v n ); let x(v n ; a ) 2 X denote the chosen alternative
Uncertainty over the realization of v introduces uncertainty about the outcome x(v n ; a ):
Recall that for each agent i 2 N; the vector u i = (u m : These independent draws from F induce a probability distribution over the in…nite matrix of values v; and hence, on the probability that each particular sequence of games f (v n )g 1 n=2 is played, and, given a ; that the sequence fx(v n ; a )g as its realization, the probability that the sequence fx(v n ; a )g
An ideal collective choice mechanism would be one such that for any realization of v; and for any equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism given v; the outcome is a best alternative. That is, an ideal mechanism would deliver x(v n ; a ) 2 b(v n ) for any , consider a second best: a mechanism that makes a best choice with probability converging to one as the population participating in the collective choice becomes arbitrarily large. While such a mechanism is not be infallible, its misses become vanishingly rare. We say that such a mechanism is asymptotically optimal.
De…nition 1 A collective choice mechanism is asymptotically optimal if
An asymptotically optimal mechanism chooses the best alternative with probability converging to one, for any collection a of sequences of equilibria. The uncertainty is with respect to the realization of the matrix of values v; and with respect to any stochastic element in the choice inherent in the rules of the mechanism.
Since values are bounded, an asymptotically optimal mechanism also asymptotically maximizes social welfare, calculated as the average value of the chosen alternative, across all agents.
Proposition 1
The quadratic voting mechanism is asymptotically optimal.
The de…nition of asymptotic optimality is ex-ante, in the sense that the optimality of the mechanism is assessed before the matrix of values v is known. We can also de…ne asymptotic optimality ex-post, for each given realization of the in…nite value matrix v 2 [0; 1] N m :
LetV
N m denote the subset of in…nite value matrixes for which the mechanism is ex-post asymptotically optimal. We say the mechanism is generically ex-post asymptotically optimal if Pr[v 2V ] = 1, and that it is ex-post asymptotically optimal if it is ex-post asymptotically optimal for v; for any v 2
A mechanism that is ex-post asymptotically optimal for v chooses the best alternative with probability converging to one, given v; for any equilibria. Since values are known, the uncertainty is only with respect to any stochastic element in the choice inherent in the rules of the mechanism. The mechanism is generically ex-post asymptotically optimal if it is expost asymptotically optimal for a generic value matrix v; where genericity of a set is de…ned as probability measure one.
Corollary 1
The quadratic voting mechanism is generically ex-post asymptotically optimal: it is ex-post asymptotically optimal for v; for any v 2 V: 9 We show by example that convergence to optimality can be fast.
Example 1 Assume the set of alternatives is f1; 2; 3g; and u i =
; 0 for any odd i 2 N 0;
The unique equilibrium is such that the probability that the ex-post utilitarian optimum (alternative 2) is chosen with 95% probability if n = 100; and with 99% probability if n = 1; 000:
Besides optimality, the mechanism also satis…es the property of asymptotically requiring zero transfers across agents: as the number of participants increases, the equilibrium action of each agent converges to zero, so her contribution converges to zero as well, and thus the per capita amount collected and redistributed by the mechanism converges to zero.
Proposition 2
Proposition 2 guarantees that even if some agents are budget constrained, however low their constraint, as long as this constraint is strictly positive, a su¢ ciently large society can run the quadratic voting mechanism with full participation by all agents.
Our last result strengthens Proposition 1, to also show that not only the best alternative receives most votes, but in addition, the full vote tally is ordered from best to worst alternatives, so that the second best alternative receives the second most net votes, the third best comes third, and so on.
Proposition 3 There existst 2 N such that for any alternative k 2 f1; :::; m 1g; and for any t >t;
It follows that if society is su¢ ciently large, even in the vanishingly rare event in which the quadratic voting mechanism does not choose optimally, for any two alternatives, the mechanism is strictly more likely to choose the socially better one.
We have proposed a quadratic voting mechanism for a collective choice with multiple alternatives. The mechanism allows each agent to express an intensity of preference for or against each alternative, and charges the agent for each alternative, the square of the agent's expressed intensity. We highlight two assumptions that limit the scope of appropriate applications: risk neutrality, and agents'common knowledge about valuations.
The assumption that agents' are risk neutral, albeit standard in mechanism design, is undoubtedly restrictive. As we note in the introduction, risk-neutrality is an appropriate assumption in applications in which the agents are …rms or investors who maximize expected pro…ts. Note that because transfers vanish to zero, the assumption of risk-neutrality is also innocuous in applications in which agents are risk-averse but they all have the same wealth. Whereas, in applications in which agents are risk-averse and the wealth distribution is unequal, the interpretation of the result is more fraught: if the marginal value of wealth is lower for wealthier agents, then wealthier agents will value the choice (in wealth units) more than poor ones, so the collective choice will be disproportionally responsive toward wealthier agents.
With regard to information, we assume that agents' valuations are common-knowledge among agents. Under this information assumption, our result that the vote-buying mechanism with quadratic costs is asymptotically optimal amounts to the …nding that the mechanism asymptotically implements in Nash equilibrium the social choice function that maximizes utilitarian welfare. This result is robust if we weaken the assumption of common knowledge of values, to assume that only the distribution of value vectors, and not the precise value matrix, is common knowledge.
With these assumptions, our main result is that the mechanism is asymptotically optimal (Proposition 1). In addition we have established that transfers converge to zero (Proposition 2) and that the probability that each alternative is chosen is asymptotically ranked in accordance to its social e¢ ciency (Proposition 3). An appendix follows, where we prove our results.
Appendix
Lemma 1 There exists a c 2 R ++ such that, if c > c; for any v 2 [0; 1] N m ; and for any n 2 Nnf1g; a pure Nash equilibrium of game (v n ) exists. 
and
Since p k (A(v n )) 2 (0; 1) for any k 2 f1; :::; mg and for any A(v n ); it follows that
are bounded below by 2 and above by 1:
below by 2m and above by 2m: Hence Since the concavity of a function is preserved under scaling, it follows that for any c > c; and for any n 2 Nnf1g; H(U i (a(v n )) is also negative de…nite, and thus U i (a(v n )) is also strictly concave.
Thus, for any c > c; a pure strategy equilibrium exists (Debreu 1952 ) for any game (v n ): Proof. In each game (v n ); for each i 2 f1; :::; ng and for each alternative k 2 X; from the utility function (2), the marginal utility for agent i of action k is (from expressions (4), (5) and (6) in the proof of Lemma 1)
Since u We establish a …rst asymptotic result: in any equilibrium in a game with su¢ ciently many players, there is one alternative that wins with arbitrarily large probability. m n ; and for any " 2 R ++ , there exists n(") 2 N such that, for any n > n("); there is k(n; a (v)) 2 f1; :::; mg such that p k(n;a (v)) (A (v n )) > 1 ":
Given that the number of alternatives is …nite, for any n 2 N such that n >n; and for any equilibrium a (v n ) of game (v n ), there is at least one k(n; a (v)) 2 f1; :::; mg such that
We prove the lemma by contradiction. Given a sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
assume (absurd) that there exists " 2 R ++ and a strictly increasingñ : N ! N such that, for each 2 N; there is a set of alternatives K( ) f1; 2; :::; mg with jK( )j > 1, such that
Since the set of alternatives is …nite, this assumption implies that there exists " 2 R ++ and a strictly increasing n 0 : N ! N such that, for each 2 N; there is a set of alternatives K f1; 2; :::; mg with jKj > 1, such that p k (A (v n 0 ( ) ) > " () k 2 K.
10
Let K + X be the largest set of alternatives such that there exists 2 (0; 1) and a strictly increasing n 0 : N ! N such that, for each 2 N;
Since jKj > 1 and K satis…es the conditions in this de…nition, jK + j jKj so jK + j > 1:
Note that for any h 2 XnK + ; lim ; but we do not denote it as such, to save on notation.
this is impossible by de…nition of K + : Hence, for any h 2 XnK + ; lim
This is expected value of the chosen alternative, averaged across all agents in f1; :::; ng; according to equilibrium a ; and given the realization of the matrix of values v n : Let k max 2 arg max
Then, since k max 2 K + and k min 2 K + ; by de…nition of
and p k min (a (v n 0 ( ) )) > 2 (0; 1) for any 2 N; and since lim !1 p h (A (v n 0 ( ) )) = 0 for any h 2 XnK + ; it follows that there exists^ 2 N such that
for any >^ :
Further, since
Since any equilibrium is interior (Lemma 2), for any v 2 V and any n 2 Nnf1g; any equilibrium a (v n ) of game (v n ) satis…es the First Order Condition:
for each k 2 X and for each i 2 f1; :::; ng: We can restate the …rst order condition as follows:
Note that from the First Order Condition as restated in Expression (10) , and summing across all agents,
which implies
which, given Expression (8), is strictly greater than
for any >^ : Further, since with probability one, lim
u k min ; it follows that with probability one,
which contradicts Expression (9).
Hence, there do not exist " 2 R ++ and a strictly increasing n 0 : N ! N such that, for each 2 N; there is a set of alternatives K( ) f1; 2; :::; mg with jK( )j > 1, such that
Equivalently, there exists n(") 2 N such that for any n > n("), jk 2 X :
Lemma 3 establishes that one alternative wins with probability arbitrarily close to one if the size n of the set of participating agents is su¢ ciently large. It does not rule out that this alternative, labeled k(n; a (v)); could vary with n: However, since the set of alternatives is …nite, we can identify a subsequence of sizes fn(t)g 1 t=1 such that along this subsequence, the alternative that wins with probability converging to one is always the same. We refer to this alternative as the "likely winner"and the label it as w(a (v)): p w(a (v)) (A (v n(t) )) = 1:
For the subsequent results, from Lemma 4 to Lemma 7, we work along the subsequence of sizes fn(t)g 1 t=1 ; and hence of games f (v n(t) )g
We show that along this subsequence, alternatives that are better than the likely winner receive positive net votes, and alternatives that are worse than the likely winner receive negative net votes. Recall that alternatives are ordered from best to worst:
Lemma 4 For any v 2 V; and for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
m n(t) ; there exists t 2 N such that for any t > t;
Proof. Recall from Expression (11) that for any k 2 X;
and since by Corollary 2, lim
Lemma 5 For any v 2 V; and for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
Proof. If w(a (v)) > 1; then by Lemma 4, there exists t 2 N such that for any t > t; A 1 (v n(t) ) > 0: By Corollary 2, lim t !1 p w(a (v)) (A (v n(t) )) = 1; which implies that there exists
) for any t > 0 and for any k 2 Xnfw(a (v))g; and in particular, A w(a (v)) (v n(t( ) ) > A 1 (v n(t( ) ) for any t > 0 : Hence, for any t > maxf t; t 0 g;
Assume (absurd) that there exist 2 R ++ and a strictly increasing t :
e : From Lemma 4, for any t > maxf t; t 0 g and for any k 2 f1; :::; w(a (v)) 1g; A k (n(t)) > 0; and hence since w(a (v)) > 1; it also follows that
1 for any t > maxf t; t 0 g; so
for any 2 N s.t. t( ) > maxf t; t 0 g; which contradicts Corollary 2.
Hence, there does not exist 2 R ++ and a strictly increasing t : N ! N such that
for any 2 N; or, equivalently, for any 2 R ++ ; 9t( ) 2 N such that
A w(a (v)) (v n(t) ) = 1; as desired.
Lemma 6
For any v 2 V; and for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
Proof. Since v 2 V; there exists t 2 N such that u w(a (v)) (v n(t) ) u k (v n(t) ) < 0 for any t > t;
for any k 2 f1; :::; w(a (v)) 1g; and thus if w(a (v)) = m (the worst alternative), then u w(a (v)) (v n(t) ) u k (v n(t) ) < 0 for any t > t; and for any k 6 2 w(a (v)): From Expression (11), for any t 2 N;
and thus if w(a (v)) = m; then A w(a (v)) (v n(t) ) < 0 for any t > t; for any k 2 f1; :::; w(a (v)) 1g; which contradicts Lemma 5. Hence, w(a (v)) 2 f1; 2; :::; m 1g:
From Expression (11), for any k > w(a (v)); and for any t 2 N;
and since (by Corollary 2), lim
p h (A (n(t))) = 0 for any k 6 = w(a (v)); it follows that for any " 2 R ++ ; there exists t(") 2 N such that for any t > t(");
Summing up over all k 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg;
Dividing both sides by
we obtain
Note that dividing the numerator and denominator of the right hand side by
the right hand side is equal to
Note that
is a weighted average of ( u w(a (v)) (v n(t) ) u k (v n(t) )) across k 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg: Since for any t >t(v) and for each alternative k. Then, for any t >t(v); and for any alternative k 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg;
Hence the denominator of Expression (15) ; for any t >t(v); and for " ="; we …nd that" < ; and hence that Expression (14) is strictly less than 1 + : Since for any " 2 R ++ and any t > t(") Expression (12) is strictly less than Expression (13) , which is equal to Expression (14) ; and since for any t >t(v) and for " ="; Expression (14) is strictly less than 1 2 ; it follows that for any t > maxft(v); t(")g; Expression (12) is strictly less than 1 2 : That is, for any t > maxft(v); t(")g;
which implies that for any t > maxft(v); t(")g;
Rearranging terms in Expression (11) , and substituting into the right hand side of (16), this right hand side is equal to
The …rst term of Expression (17) diverges to in…nity in t (the numerator diverges to in…nity by Lemma 5 and the denominator is a probability that converges to one by Corollary 2) and the second term being subtracted is negative for su¢ ciently large t; because v 2 V implies that there exists t 2 N such that u w(a (v)) (v n(t) ) < u k (v n(t) ) for any t > t; for any k < w(a (v)):
Hence, Expression (17) diverges to in…nity. Hence,
which implies that there exists k 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg such that lim
Let l 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg be an alternative such that lim
Corollary 3 For any v 2 V; and for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
if w(a (v)) > 1; there exists a strictly increasing t : N ! N such that for any 2 N;
That is, along subsequence fn(t( ))g 1 =1 ; alternative l receives monotonically decreasing aggregate net actions, diverging toward 1: We next show that the aggregate actions on all other alternatives worse than w also diverge to 1 along this subsequence.
Lemma 7 For any v 2 V; and for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2
m n(t( )) ; and for any k 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg; lim
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Assume (absurd) that there exists k 2 fw(a (v)) + 1; :::; mg, 2 R and a strictly increasing :
; which is equal to
By Corollary 2,
and since v 2 V; lim
so in particular, the ratio does not diverge and remains bounded. Further, since lim
Hence, taking the limits on both sides of Expression (18) , and substituting in Expression (19) and Expression (20) in the right hand side,
However, lim
a contradiction, so the initial assumption is false. Thus, for any k > w(a (v)); lim 
That is, we have identi…ed a subsequence fn(t( ( )))g 1 =1 such that the aggregate actions on all alternatives worse than w(a (v)) are strictly decreasing toward minus in…nity along the subsequence.
Proposition 1
Proof. Recall from Expression (11) that for any v 2 V; for any sequence of equilibria
m n ; and for any n 2 Nnf1g;
and A w(a (v)) (v n )2c
which, decomposing the right-hand side, is equal to
Since lim
A k (n(t( ( )))) = 1 (Lemma 7 and Corollary 4), it follows that lim !1 e A k (v n(t( ( ))) ) = 0 so the second term of Expression (22) converges to zero along the subsequence fn(t( ( )))g ( u w(a (v)) (v n(t( ( ))) ) u k (v n(t( ( ))) ))e ( u w(a (v)) (v n(t( ( ))) ) u k (v n(t( ( ))) ))e A k (v n(t( ( ))) )
1
A :
If w(a (v)) > 1; then for any k 2 f1; :::; w(a (v)) 1g; there exists 2 N such that for any > , u w(a (v)) (v n(t( ( ))) ) < u k (v n(t( ( ))) ) (because v 2 V ) and A k (v n(t( ( ))) ) > 0 (by Lemma 4), which implies e A k (v n (t( ( )))) > 1. So for any > ;
( u w(a (v)) (v n(t( ( ))) ) u k (v n(t( ( ))) )) < for some < 0:
Therefore, if w(a (v)) > 1; Expression (23) is negative, and thus, from equalities (21), (22) and (23) , A w(a (v)) (v n(t( ( ))) ) < 0 for any > ; for any v 2 V; and for any sequence of equilibria a (v) 2 1 Q n=2 [ 1; 1] m n . But A w(a (v)) (n(t( ( )))) < 0 together with A k (n(t( ( )))) > 0 for k < w(a (v)) contradicts the de…nition of w(a (v)) as the likely winner: the likely winner must have the most votes. Thus, it follows that w(a (v)) = 1; as desired. Recall that the likely winner w(a (v)) was …rst de…ned with respect to a particular subsequence of society sizes fn(t)g 1 t=1 so that it remain constant within this sequence. The de…nition allowed that the likely winner be di¤erent for a di¤erent subsequence. Now we have established that for an arbitrary subsequence, the likely winner is alternative 1: This applies to all subsequences, which establishes that the likely winner is in fact, w(a (v)) = 1 for all subsequences, as desired.
We next note that actions, and hence transfers, converge to zero in the number of participants. Proof. This follows as a corollary from Lemma 3, which …nds that for any n > n("); there is one alternative k(n; a (v)) such that lim n !1 p k(n;a (v)) (A (v n )) ! 1; and from Expression (10), which …nds that for each k 2 X and each i 2 f1; :::; ng;
hence, taking limits,
Finally, we prove that the equilibrium net aggregate actions asymptotically correspond to the full order of alternatives from best to worst. there existst 2 N such that for any alternative k 2 f1; :::; m 1g; and for any t >t;
A k (v n(t) ) > A k+1 (v n(t) ): 2 (0; 1):
By Lemma 4, there exists t 2 N such that for any t > t; A k (v n(t) ) < 0 and A k+1 (v n(t) ) < 0:
So for any t > t;
e (A k+1 (v n(t) ) A k (v n(t) )) 1;
Taking the contrapositive, for any t > t;
A k (v n(t) ) A k+1 (v n(t) ) e (A k+1 (v n(t) ) A k (v n(t) )) < 1 =) A k+1 (v n(t) ) < A k (v n(t) ):
Since, by Expression (24),
e (A k+1 (v n(t) ) A k (v n(t) )) 2 (0; 1); it follows that there ist 2 N such that for any t >t; A k+1 (v n(t) ) < A k (v n(t) ); as desired.
